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THE CORPORATE FARMING DEBATE IN THE
POST.. WORLD WAR II MIDWEST

JON LAUCK

Ben Hogan balanced a mix of milk cows, corn,
soybeans, sheep, and turkeys, avoided borrowing too much, invented his own machinery,
and maintained an orderly farm, keeping his
fences "horse high, bull strong and hog tight."
Above all, he worked hard: "He worked and
never slowed. He bulled his way through the
house before sunrise each morning, growling
to his sons to get out of bed and do the chores."
He motivated the sons, who worked as hard as
he did, by telling them "You're the laziest
damned rednecks I ever laid eyes on. You're
the weakest goddamned mollycoddles I ever

seen." He souped up his tractors so "he could
plow or disc or cultivate more acres per day
than anyone else in the county." By the time
World War II started he bought out three other
farms around Nowell, South Dakota, expanding his operation from 160 acres to 480. 1
Like millions of other midwestern farmers
during the postwar price plunge, however,
Hogan's fortunes collapsed. When his credit
dried up, he borrowed money from the NowellSafebuy processing plant, which had purchased
his mortgage from the bank. The loan stipulated that the turkeys he raised with the borrowed money could only make their way to
the Nowell-Safebuy, where the company could
choose the turkeys it wanted and refuse to buy
the undesirables. Ben hated the arrangement:
"There ain't a dirt farmer got a pot to piss in,
what with prices are this year. . . . A man
either keeps raising turkeys or he don't get no
loans. A man can't make it without loans.
There's no telling how many farms gone under
that way since the war. And the NowellSafebuy ends up with 'em all." When feed costs
increased, Nowell farmers could not make their
loan payments and filed suit against Safebuy.
The judge ruled that the contract gave Safe buy
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"undue bargaining power to set prices on the
products it buys and undue power to depress
prices in a regional market it virtually controls" and refused to "enforce unconscionable
bargains." The company then decided on a
new corporate strategy, actual ownership of
the turkey farms, bypassing the family farmers
completely and creating a larger, more efficient, integrated corporate farming institution. 2
The strategy of the Nowell-Safebuy described in Douglas Unger's novel Leaving the
Land is not new. Corporate attempts to take
advantage of scale in American farming are as
old as the Republic, but their limited successes
kept public criticism at a minimum. The years
after World War II, however, marked a "major
turning point in American agricultural history" when corporate farming-agricultural
production conducted by large-scale industrial
corporations in lieu of family farms-became
a heated public issue. 3 "[Y]ou would end up
with what they had in Poland," predicted the
manager of the Grain Terminal Association,
"where a large number of great big, fat landlords owned the land, and it was worked by
millions of peasant's-complete feudalism."
Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), a prominent
leader in the effort to curb corporate farming,
constantly attacked the "trend toward corporate farms" and attempts by corporate agribusiness to "complete the vertical chain from
seed to supermarket."4 Such fears resulted in a
series of studies and long public debates over
the issue and prompted significant legislative
action, especially at the state level. In retrospect, contemporary warnings about the" emotional appeals" of the anticorporate farming
advocates and the "crisis atmosphere" they
created seem justified. 5 The changes that took
place were more influenced by the consolidation of existing family farms than any outside
"corporate invasion."
The debate continues, however. In 1982
Nebraska passed Initiative 300, amending the
state constitution to allow only family-farm
corporations to engage in farming. In 1983

Jim Hightower, the anticorporate farming activist, was elected agricultural commissioner
in Texas. In 1988 South Dakota toughened its
corporate farming law to prevent National
Farms from establishing a large-scale livestock
operation in the state. More recently, fourteen counties in Kansas put anticorporate farming laws on the ballot and they passed in
twelve. More than a dozen family-farm, religious, and environmental groups are currently
working to prevent large-scale hog operations
from becoming the norm in Iowa. 6
In the postwar years the president of the
National Farmers Organization (NFO) believed that the country was "losing free men"
to a corporate agriculture that would soon
control farmers' lives like the large growers in
California controlled Mexican farm workers.
He viewed corporate involvement in farming
as "Phase I of a corporate takeover of the food
industry, which would involve acquiring or
controlling all phases of production, processing and retailing."7 The Washington Post noted
fears of "20th century agricultural feudalism,"
the president of the Agricultural History Society cited the fear of "a latter-day enclosure
movement in the American countryside," and
a prominent agricultural economist feared
"farming [would] be swallowed up" by corporate conglomerates "as nonchalantly as a pelican swallows a fish."8
The arguments drew on the historical view
that the proper form of the market economy
was that of many scattered small-scale producers, a system perverted by the coming of
big business in the late nineteenth century.
The result was the concentrated wealth and
power of the "moneyed men," the essence of
the "monopoly problem" to some, in sectors
like steel making and car building. The opponents of corporate farming feared that "agriculture [would] become-like steel, autos, and
chemicals-an industry dominated by giant
conglomerate corporations such as Tenneco."
Protesting the establishment of a large-scale
hog production facility in the early 1970s, the
NFO declared that "Weare not going to allow
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a handful of corporate executives to control
food production in the manner in which they
now control oil, drugs, and autos."9
Given the events of the era, frequent comparisons were made to the competitive problems of the oil industry. Congressman David
Obey (D-WI) compared the corporate farming issue to "Our troubles with a few oil giants," and Micki Nellis of American Agricultural
News argued that "When the same companies
which control the energy also control the food,
they can bring any nation to its knees-including America." Senator Abourezk of South
Dakota agreed that "While monopoly control
in food is not yet what it is in oil, all the
symptoms are there." An oft-sighted bumper
sticker on midwestern pickups: "If you think
oil prices are high, wait till they own the
farms. "10
Earl Butz, Nixon's choice to be secretary of
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
in 1971, contributed further to the fears of
corporate farming. Butz worked for the muchhated Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft
Benson in the 1950s, advocated rolling back
farm programs, encouraged larger farms, and
served on the boards of agribusinesses like
Ralston-Purina and Stokely-Van Campi he was
barely confirmed by the Senate after a bitter
debate. When anti-corporate farming bills
came before the Congress his department opposed them, earning him condemnation as an
"apologist for corporate power" from the New
York Times and many othersY
The views of those farmers who felt they
were being sold out to corporate agriculture
seemed legitimized when it was revealed that
some government officials were involved as
corporate officers or consultants to agribusiness. Clifford Hardin, who was replaced
by Butz as secretary, took an executive position with Ralston-Purina when he left.
Clarence Palmby, who was assistant secretary
of agriculture when the Russian grain sales of
1972 were organized, afterward went to Continental Grain Company, one of the major
companies involved in the transaction. Another assistant secretary, prior to taking his
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post, was a senior vice president at Bank of
America, which was involved in corporate
farming investments. Virgil W odika,· before
taking over the Food Bureau of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), was a paid consultant to Ralston-Purina, Libby, McNeill &
Libby, and Hunt FoodsY
Thus, Congressman Jim Abourezk (D-SD)
could tell the statewide South Dakota Farmers Union picnic in 1972 that USDA officials
were "retreads from the Benson era or recent
recruits from the corporate boardroom." When
running for president that year, Senator
George McGovern asserted that Butz "was
thoroughly committed to the gentlemen farmers in agribusiness, who couldn't tell a chicken
coop from a chain store." Senator Fred Harris
(D-OK) could argue that "the government has
continually sided with the giant agribusinesses,
turning its back on the little man." Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) warned the Iowa
Farmers Union that "we may be forced to watch
corporate agriculture spread its tentacles to
every farm in the nation." When running for
president in 1976, Jimmy Carter could denounce the "sweetheart arrangement" between
USDA, big grain firms, and agribusiness. The
Agribusiness Accountability Project could label the agribusiness-USDA connection as
"Agri-Government." And a farm couple could
tell Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) that
"the Department of Agriculture & Administration & Big business guns [were] out to get
[them]."13
Many believed that corporate influence also
dominated the land-grant colleges that were
responsible for research and extension services
fO.r agriculture. The farm activist Jim Hightower argued in 1972 that "[The land-grant
college complex]-composed of colleges of
agriculture, agricultural experiment stations
and state extension services-has put its tax
dollars, its facilities, its manpower, its energies and its thoughts almost solely into efforts
that have worked to the advantage and profit
oflarge corporations involved in agriculture."
Instead of providing leadership on issues like
the corporate farming debate, "the land grant
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community has ducked behind the corporate
skirt, mumbling apologetic words like 'progress,' 'efficiency,' and 'inevitability.'" When
land grant colleges did conduct research, many
farmers and farm groups did not believe the
studies because of the colleges' corporate connections. 14
The federal Small Business Administration
(SBA) also received criticism. Created in the
1950s to offer low-interest loans to start-up
businesses, the SBA made loans to individuals
hoping to start livestock confinement operations, creating a great deal of hostility from
farmers already established in livestock production. Senator Nelson, chairman of the Senate Small Business Committee, noted SBA
support for hog confinements: "The SBA's loan
practice in this area is especially disturbing
because hogs are known to many farmers as
'mortgage burners'-low capital ways for young
farmers to get a foothold in farming. As it
stands, the SBA's policies are helping to fund
the very factories which are driving people
out of farming."15
The suspicions and fears and prognostications of a "corporate takeover" of production
agriculture were consistently legitimized by
farm-state politicians. The corporate farming
issue became a staple of postwar Democratic
politics beginning in the 1950s. George
McGovern of South Dakota is a good example.
When changes in the poultry industry in the
1950s increased production and efficiency, it
tended to drive egg prices down, triggering
angry letters from farmwives about the dwindling amount of "egg money." McGovern responded by criticizing the "huge corporate
interests" and "vertical integration" in farming. 16 During his 1960 senate race against Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD), McGovern told a
Democratic fund-raiser that "If Nixon is
elected, with men like Mundt who support
him ... the family farm is doomed as an institution and corporate agriculture will sweep
the country."17 When he ran for president in
1972 he advocated his bill to "prohibit giant
non-farm conglomerates from taking over family farms" and the Democratic platform stated

that the "family-type farm is threatened with
extinction. American farming is passing to
corporate control."18 Politicians such as Senators Nelson, Hubert Humphrey (MN), Walter
Mondale (MN), James Abourezk (SD), Harold
Hughes (IA), Frank Church (ID), and Fred
Harris (OK) all invoked the issue in similar
ways.
In addition to elected officials and the warnings of prominent farm organizations like the
Farmer's Union and the NFO, religious leaders (especially Catholics), environmentalists,
assorted writers, and network television were
involved in the corporate farming debate. The
rural life director of the Catholic Church in
South Dakota told the state legislature that
"The family and ownership ofland is the natural God-given way of human living and whenever the church or the state or powerful
influential people forget that, and take over
the ownership of God's land in a disproportionate manner, the economic, spiritual, and
social balance of a nation is disturbed and evils
of every kind result." The director of the Heartland Project of midwestern Catholic bishops
asked that the "ideology of 'free enterprise'"
be subsumed to "Christian, Jewish, and humanist perspectives that emphasize relationship, interdependence, and distributive justice,
including fair compensation." In 1973 the N ebraska Catholic Conference advocated legislation to stop the "expansion of giant farm
corporations" and called on Catholics in Nebraska to inform themselves on the issue, to
celebrate Rural Life Sunday, and to support
groups with similar views; internationally, the
church adopted the view that "if certain landed
estates impede the general prosperity because
they are extensive, unused, or poorly used, or
because they bring hardship to peoples or are
detrimental to the interests of the country,
the common good sometimes demands their
expropriation."19 In 1979 the president of the
National Catholic Rural Life Conference reminded Catholics that "we are but sojourners
and guests upon the Lord's land," promoted
farming "as a way of life," and criticized "An
agriculture characterized by industrialized
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farms with absentee owners [which] benefits a
relatively privileged few and seriously weakens the nation's stability." The forty-four members of the Midwestern Roman Catholic
Bishops also published the pamphlet Strangers
and Guests: Toward Community in the Heartland, which proposed ending corporate acquisitions of farmland. 20 When the NFO, which
had a disproportionately high number of
Catholic members, started advocating collective bargaining for farmers as a strategy for
preserving family farms and avoiding corporate agriculture, the church supported their
efforts. Pope John XXIII even released a papal
encyclical on agriculture promoting collective
bargaining.21
Environmentalists also objected to corporate farms, viewing them as "unnecessarily disruptive of the environment," using more
pesticides and herbicides, generating more
waste, and producing surpluses that depressed
prices, hurting small farmers. 22 Senator Nelson,
one of the earliest advocates of environmental protections in the 1960s and 1970s, urged
cooperation between environmental groups
and small farmers. During debate over an
anticorporate farming bill in 1972, Nelson's
legislative assistant told environmentalists to
support the bill because the "small, independent farmer has close ties to the land and
therefore is far superior to the insensitive manager when it comes to environmental protection."23
Activists included Wendell Berry, probably
the best-known critic of "industrial agriculture." When Earl Butz reviewed Berry's book
The Unsettling of America, the clash between
Butz's view of free-market economic change
and Berry's defense of "agricultural fundamentalism" and the "man-earth relationship"
became clear.24 The Center for Rural Affairs,
founded in 1973 in Walthill, Nebraska, by the
activist Marty Strange, consistently advocated
reducing technology and energy-intensive inputs, the use of which it considered part of the
country's "cultural crisis," and promoted "renewable and sustainable" farming as an alternative. 2s
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In 1971 NBC produced a program entitled
"Leaving Home Blues: An NBC White Paper
on Rural Migration." In the program, news
correspondent Garrick Utley spoke of "forced
migration: the movement of people from rural
America who don't want to go. Who would
not go if they had a choice. But the choice is
gone: devoured by markets and mechanization in agriculture and the failure of industry
or government to provide new or adequate
jobs." Nebraska, one of the areas featured in
the program, in the ten years prior to 1971
had seen 73,000 more people leave the state
than enter. One Nebraska farmer offered to
show the newsmen all the vacated farmsteads
and the planted fields where farmers' homes
had stood five or ten years prior. The program
forcefully depicted the problem of rural depopulation but infuriated anticorporate farming advocates for not making a more specific
link to corporations. The Agribusiness Accountability Project, which helped NBC produce the show, attacked the network's
president for his "toothless," "superficial," and
"cowardly" production, accusing him of deleting the mention of "every corporate offender
that is big enough to cause trouble for NBC."26
The Agribusiness Accountability Project and
others made clear to the public that they believed corporate farming accounted for the
outmigration.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of
an impending corporate order in grain belt
farming were precedents in the American
South, California, and the Third World. The
changes in poultry that led to a large degree
of contractual integration between corporatio,ns and small farmers was perhaps the most
daunting. As the New York Times told the
story, "Until after World War II, many broilers were raised in the barnyards of family farms.
Small flocks of chickens, always underfoot,
supplied added income, cash for birthday presents or a winter weekend in the city. Today,
there is virtually no market for barnyard chickens. Instead, the family farmer is usually growing broilers under contract for one of the
big-agrigiants." The corporation could reduce
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payments or cut the farmer off completely at
any time, but it was difficult for the farmer to
escape since he owed the corporation for the
production supplies furnished by the corporation. The situation triggered lawsuits on the
Delmarva Peninsula and farmer-picketing of
corporate offices in northern Alabama.27 The
USDA calculated that the chicken farmers
were making about 54 cents an hour, an arrangement denounced as "poultry peonage"
by Ralph Nader and his raiders. Roger
Blobaum, an Iowa Democrat who ran for Congress in 1970, argued that "The value of corporate secrecy was dramatically illustrated in
the 1950s when feed companies persuaded
chicken growers in the South to sign contracts
that made them as powerless as sharecroppers."
Harrison Wellford, a Harvard fellow connected
to Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive
Law, invoked the fear of such conditions migrating north: "The role of major national corporations such as Ralston-Purina and Pillsbury
in the integrated chicken industry of the south
should be instructive for all those who wish,
for social or economic reasons, to preserve the
independence of the family farmer."28 The
president of the NFO in 1971 issued warnings
about the "Kleen Leen" integration contracts
offered by Ralston-Purina, who "draws on years
of experience turning independent broiler
growers in the South into low-income contractors."29 The president of the NFU argued
that "This is bringing business integration right
onto the farm, somewhat reminiscent of the
notorious sweat shop system for sending piecework into tenements for cheap hand labor."
Jim Hightower asserted that "This corporate
invasion of poultry has humbled thousands of
these small farmers, reducing them from hearty
free-enterprisers to assembly-line cogS."30
Many feared that the "contract system [that]
has turned many chicken producers into little
more than low-paid employees of the large
broiler companies" would also develop in
grain-belt hog, cattle, corn, wheat, and bean
sectors. The NFO consistently cautioned
against the coming of vertical contracting to
the grain belt. As they saw it, packers and

processors could use individual contracts with
farmers to undermine the collective bargaining for a master contract that the NFO advocated. Ralph Nader came to the NFO
convention in 1971 and echoed the complaints
about the government's "refusal to invoke the
antitrust laws against vertical integration."31
Grain belt fears of corporate takeover were
also enhanced by stories originating in California. Tenneco, Standard Oil of California,
and Belridge Oil Company, for example, all
bought large pieces of land on which to grow
fruits and vegetables. The Federal Trade Commission actually charged United Brands and
Pure x Corporation with seeking to monopolize the production of fresh vegetables, arguing that United Brands was trying to change
the lettuce and celery business from one of
small, independent growers to one dominated
by conglomerates. The concerns among grainbelt farmers were also heightened by the steady
stream of stories in the postwar period about
the plight of farm workers, especially in California. Many believed that theirs was a future
of wage-labor to mega-farms, like the Mexicans picking lettuce, grapes, strawberries, and
tomatoes in the Central Valley-like the Joads'
journey from independent Plains farmers to
California farm workers in The Grapes of
Wrath. Religious leaders and social reformers
in the 1950s, reform politicians and the media
in the 1960s, coupled with President Johnson's
War on Poverty, highlighted the problems of
the farm workers of California. When the
Agribusiness Accountability Project was
formed in December 1971, its stated purpose
was to study the problems of farm workers and
expose the agribusiness conglomerates that
frustrated efforts to help them-it was not long
before the mission of the organization was
expanded into corporate farming and antitrust
areas. 32
Lurking behind the fears of the California
system was a 1946 study-The Tale of Two
Cities-of two small California towns in the
Central Valley, Arvin and Dinuba. One of
the communities was dominated by largescale corporate farming and the other was
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structured in a pattern similar to small towns
in the grain belt, with many small, dispersed
family farms cotnp£ising the agricultural community. Although the two towns were in the
same climate, produced the same amount of
commodities, and were equidistant from other
towns, cities, and transportation, other differences were striking. The town surrounded by
family farms had more and better schools,
churches, recreational facilities, civic organizations, public services, a better standard of
living, greater individual ownership, and a 61percent-larger retail trade. Many grain belt
leaders believed such traditions and institutions in their small towns would be destroyed
with the coming of corporate farming. 33
When the United States became heavily
involved in foreign aid after Wodd War II,
policy-makers placed a steady emphasis on land
reform in recipient countries. Said President
Truman to the United Nations: "We know
that peoples of Asia have problems of social
injustice to solve. They want their farmers to
own their land and to enjoy the fruits of their
toil. That is one of our great national principles also. We believe in the family size farm
that is the basis for our agriculture and has
strongly defended our form of government."
Ngo Dinh Diem received lectures about the
need to broaden land ownership in South Vietnam and the countries of Latin American were
steered in this direction by the Alliance for
Progress, as were all the countries that participated in the United Nations' World Land
Reform Conference in 1966. Harold F.
Breimyer, an agricultural economist at the
University of Missouri, noted that "Our development counselors exhort nations so burdened to undertake agrarian reform. Fine; but
we ought also be mindful of our own state of
affairs" and other farm advocates offered warnings about the potential "Central Americanization" of the grain belt. 34 Later in the same
year that Breimyer made his comments, for
the first time in American history, a National
Land Reform Conference was held in San Francisco and the corporate farming issue discussed.
Smaller midwestern land conferences were
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later held to carryon the work started in San
Francisco, and Senator Fred Harris (D-OK)
extolled the "need for land reform" in the Senate. 35 The president of the NFU even advocated a land reform program in which the
federal government would buy good land for
resale to small family farmers at reduced prices.
In 1975 the NFO called attention to the death
of Wolf Ladejinsky, who fled Bolshevism in
the Soviet Union in 1922, came to the United
States and received a master's degree in agricultural economics in 1931 from Columbia,
and became an advocate of land reform. By
helping to coordinate the redistribution of land
in postwar Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
South Vietnam, he became "Russia's greatest
enemy in Asia." The NFO noted that when
the communists invaded South Korea, they
met little resistance where land was held by a
few large landholders but met heavy resistance
where land reform had succeeded: "The inhabitants there had a stake in the land and
organized to defend it." They juxtaposed
Ladejinsky's work with Secretary Butz's "advocacy of big, integrated agricultural operations."36
As the Arvin and Dinuba and land reform
arguments indicate, one of the core criticisms
of corporate farming involved the corrosive
affect of concentrated land ownership on republicanism and the civic tradition. The images of antirepublican regimes like the landed
caudillos of Latin America, the injustice of
concentrated land ownership in South Vietnam, the feudal kingdoms of medieval Europe, and the enclosure movement were all
invoked against corporate farming. As oppone.nts saw it, the new land barons would be
corporate conglomerates like Tenneco and
ITT. The goal of the Arvin and Dinuba study
was to test the "hypothesis that the institution of small independent farmers is indeed
the agent which creates the homogenous comml.mity, both socially and economically democratic." The president of the Iowa Farmers
Union was opposed to "corporate agriculture
of the Fascist type," and Senator McGovern,
on the floor ofthe Senate, wondered "whether
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the new society toward which we are heading,
a sort of corporate collectivism, is what we
really want."37 Not by accident, Senator
Nelson's subcommittee print after the corporate farming hearings quoted Webster:
Our New England ancestors brought thither
no great capitals from Europe; and if they
had, there was nothing productive in which
they could have been invested. They left
behind them the whole feudal policy of the
other continent .... They came to a new
country. There were as yet no lands yielding rent, and no tenants rendering service.
The whole soil was unreclaimed from barbarism. They were themselves either from
their original condition or from the necessity of their common interest, nearly on a
level in respect to property. Their situation
demanded a parcelling out and division of
the land, and it may fairly be said that this
necessary act fixed the future frame and
form of their government. The character of
their political institutions was determined
by the fundamental laws respecting property. . . . The consequences of all these
causes have been a great subdivision of the
soil and a great equality of condition; the
true basis, most certainly of popular government. 38
Fewer farms also meant more farmers were
forced to migrate to the most unstable, violent (especially in the mid-1960s), socially
stratified, and undemocratic of places, the big
cities. "The mobs of great cities," Thomas
Jefferson said, "add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the
strength of the human body." A North Dakota farm couple argued that the corporations
are "driving contented folks off the land to
the already congested, crime-laden city life.
This is certainly not the way the Good Lord
intended it to be." M. W. Thatcher agreed: "I
think and I believe that the most important
thing that we have to do to maintain democracy is to preserve on the farm lands that independent husband and wife and those children

in that castle on their land, that farm family
on their land, supporting these villages and
these towns and maintaining that character of
life, or you won't have a democracy fifty years
from now . It's both, or neither. You don't think
there's any democracy in Harlem, do you?"
The president of the NFU added other "festering ghettoes-Watts, Detroit, Chicago, and
Washington. "39
In 1968 Senator Nelson's Small Business
Subcommittee on Monopoly held regional
hearings on the subject of corporate farming
(one of the stated goals was to update the Arvin
and Dinuba study conducted in 1946).40 The
first hearing began on 20 May in Omaha, N ebraska. The president of the National Farmers
Union, Tony Dechant, and the presidents of
the Nebraska, Iowa, and South Dakota Farmers Union all testified. Dechant warned of
corporate farms taking advantage of tax writeoffs, wreaking environmental damage, threatening small rural communities, and interfering
with traditional marketing systems. Ben
Radcliffe, president of the South Dakota Farmers Union, argued that a study by his organization discovered "452 corporations owning
agricultural land in South Dakota, totaling
1,633,529 acres, or the equivalent offive medium-sized South Dakota counties ... one out
of every 27 acres of farmland in our state."41
The second hearing in Eau Claire, Wisconsin,
was delayed by the assassination of Senator
Robert Kennedy-who received significant
farmer support in his presidential primary wins
in Nebraska and South Dakota that year-but
produced similar testimony when it was heldY
Later in the year the NFU released its book
The Corporate Invasion of American Agriculture, hoping it would publicize the problem
and reverse the view that the loss of family
farms was inevitable. 43
Those alarmed by the trends they detected
could point to several examples. Based on its
experience operating a 180,000-acre ranch in
Wyoming, Gates Rubber Company bought
several thousand acres in Colorado and also
set up egg production operations in Colorado
and New Mexico. The NFU argued that Gates
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was buying so much land that it was driving
land values to a level that prohibited local
farmers from expanding. Kansas City-based
CBK Industries moved into production agriculture, and the president promised a whole
new age of farming. The president of the Iowa
Farmers Union also reported on the 6,000acre operation known as Shinrone Farms,
which bought hundreds of thousands of dollars in machinery from Massey-Ferguson and
painted them white with green shamrocks due
to the "sentimentality about Ireland" of the
owner, a Detroit trucking executive. The Center for Rural Affairs reported on forty-three
"factory-type" hog operations in Nebraska in
1974. Environmental Applications Inc. started
an eighty-acre operation in southwestern Minnesota to produce 13,000 hogs a year. Swift
and Ralston-Purina proposed a $2.5 milliona-year hog production operation near Kahoka,
Missouri, which the NFO feared would eventually "monopolize a whole type of production" through "elimination of independent
producers of hogs and consequent elimination of effective and efficient competition."
The Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle Company expanded its holdings to 1.2 million
acres and started cattle feedlots and meatpacking. The Ceres Land Company of Sterling, Colorado, acquired several thousand
acres of land in eastern Colorado to irrigate
pastures and feed cattle. More familiar companies cited in the debate include Tenneco,
American Cyanamid, Bunge Inc., Del Monte,
Goodyear, Gulf & Western, Heinz, LibbyMcNeil & Libby, Minute Maid, Pillsbury,
Standard Oil, DuPont, Dow, Chase Manhattan, Getty Oil, and Textron. Tenneco, the
thirty-fourth-largest US corporation who
promised its stockholders "integration from
seedling to supermarket," became a symbol of
the much-feared "corporate farmer." Once
Tennessee Gas Transmission Company,
Tenneco expanded into oil production, shipbuilding, chemicals, manufacturing (including the acquisition of J.1. Case), and tens of
thousands of acres of land for growing fruits
and vegetables, and was seen as representa-
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tive of the "conglomerate invasion of agriculture."44
In the early years of the debate the studies
and statistics of corporate farming were always in dispute. At the opening of Senator
Nelson's hearings in Omaha, two agricultural
economists from the University of Nebraska
argued that information on the level of corporate farming was simply not available, despite
the examples cited by the many witnesses calling for legislation. The NFO, on the other
hand, constantly pointed out that the level of
contractual integration was obscured, that the
USDA was using 1963 statistics as late as 1971,
and that professors at land-grant colleges were
afraid to conduct research properly because
they feared losing grants offered by companies
like Ralston-Purina and Safeway.45 In 1971
Senator Nelson held Congressional hearings
on agribusiness "secrecy" in an attempt to get
better statistics on the number of corporate
farms in operation. The chairman of the
Agribusiness Accountability Project, Phillip
Sorenson, called for a law requiring the Securities and Exchange Commission to ask companies about their farming activities and for
an annual report to Congress on corporate
involvement in agriculture. 46
In 1969 the agricultural census included
corporate farming for the first time. In the
first compilation of data from the census, released in 1972, the Census Bureau reported
only 21,513 farms with sales over $2,500 that
were "corporate," or about 1.2 percent. Of
these farms, 19,716 had less than ten stockholders, indicating many incorporated family
farmsY But several of the conclusions of the
researchers were challenged by Professor Richard Rodefeld, a sociologist at Michigan State
University, in a speech to the First National
Land Reform Conference. Rodefeld argued
that early statistics counted the sharecroppers
on large southern plantations as part of a "multiple-unit operation," but later statistics
counted the sharecroppers separately, giving
the impression that fewer large farms had appeared and that fewer family farms had disappeared. He also argued that the aggregate
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statistics obscured the large-scale corporate
involvement in states like California and Arizona and that the amount of sales accounted
for by large farms was grossly disproportionate
to their actual numbers. Senator McGovern
argued that the "new information" proved that
he and other anticorporate farming advocates
were not "crying wolf' and called on the USDA
to stop ignoring the problem; USDA economists responded by calling the "corporate
farmer" a "straw man."48
The statistical clash was showcased in the
early 1970s when Congress held hearings on
corporate farming. The American Farm Bureau Federation told Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, that
there is "little solid evidence that [the entry of
conglomerate corporations into farming] is a
serious problem." On the basis of the best
USDA statistics available they argued that less
than 1 percent of farms were incorporated and
that many of these were family owned. J. Phil
Campbell, the undersecretary of agriculture
representing the Nixon administration, also
opposed legislation limiting the corporate
ownership of farmland on this basis, while also
fearing the damage it would do to existing
corporate farm operations. The National
Grange also worried about the precedent, arguing that "it would be the first time in our
knowledge that Congress had passed legislation that would limit by law persons who could
engage in a particular industry." Professor
Rodefeld testified that aggregate statistics were
misleading, that corporate farms were actually
dominant in certain parts of the country, and
that the "inevitability" of corporate farming
justified early legislative action. He challenged
the USDA on what he considered their incompatible views-corporate farming was not
a problem but an anticorporate farming law
would hurt many corporations. 49
The intense fears associated with corporate
farming would slowly subside as more and more
studies indicated that the "invasion" argument
was overdrawn. The Food and Agricultural
Act of 1977 included a provision directing
the secretary of agriculture to conduct a large-

scale investigation of the structure of agricultural production. The Carter administration's
new secretary of agriculture, Bob Bergland, a
farmer from northern Minnesota, announced
a "national dialogue" on the structure issue at
the National Farmers Union annual meeting
in 1979. He aimed to overcome the earlier
statistical problems by "amass[ing] the most
comprehensive and reliable base of data ever
compiled." By 1982 USDA numbers indicated
that corporate farms still only represented 2.6
percent of all farms in the country, but did
account for 23 percent of product sales. 50
Whatever the statistics, the concern about
outside corporate control was long-standing
in the grain belt and, unlike other regions in
the 1970s, a consensus existed that the trend
toward corporate farming should be opposed.
The Populists passed laws limiting corporate
farming in Minnesota and Nebraska, and in
the 1930s laws were passed in North Dakota
and Kansas. Building on this tradition in the
1970s, South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin,
and Missouri limited corporate farming, and
Iowa and Nebraska adopted formal reporting
requirements. Iowa also limited ownership of
land by trusts other than authorized farm trusts,
family farm trusts, or testamentary trusts. The
Populist antagonism toward concentrated economic power and the agrarian proclivity for
dispersed and decentralized ownership were
still powerful in the grain belt and evident in
the laws passed in the 1970s. The Iowa law
spelled out the need for a dispersed agriculture and the need to preserve small communities, the Nebraska law was designed to prevent
the potential monopolization of agriculture,
and the South Dakota law "recogniz[ed] the
importance of the family farm to the economic
and moral stability of the State."51
Starting in 1971 the US Congress also held
several hearings on bills-usually entitled the
Family Farm Antitrust Act-which would
have formally outlawed ownership of farmland
by anyone possessing more than a few million
dollars in nonfarm assets. 52 The federal efforts
were consistently stymied, however, by the
thin evidence of an "invasion," the reluctance
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of the USDA and the Department of Justice,
the criticism of the measure for midwestern
"parochialism," and the fact that Congress,
unlike farm-state legislatures, was not made
up of farmers and small-town business leaders
dependent on the farm economy. Political
concerns about the size of the bonanza farms
on the nineteenth century Plains eased when
the farms "disintegrated in the hard nineties"
and so too did worries about corporate farming ease when large-scale operations like Black
Watch Farms and the farm operated by Gates
Rubber Company failed, further deflating legislative efforts. 53 Numerous studies indicated
that larger farms were not more efficient than
smaller, family farms-maximum cost-saving
production effiCiency could be reached farming under 1,000 acres of corn and wheat. 54 It
was also discovered that the reason some
corporations became interested in farming in
the 1960s and 1970s stemmed from a tax loophole, which was subsequently closed. The federallegislative effort also sputtered since many
farmers benefited from acquiring new land and,
in the Midwest, most consolidation stemmed
from farms being bought by other farmers, like
Ben Hogan before the war and not by outside
corporations. 55 Even Hogan's nemesis, the
Nowell-Safebuy, went bankrupt. The company
should have noticed the Gates Rubber
Company's fiasco with wheat farming in Colorado. Gates had to hire 50 percent more workers than the total number of independent
farmers who previously ran the farms for the
same amount of production. Safebuy, soon
after it adopted its corporate ownership strategy, began losing money, laid off its workers at
the turkey processing plant, and shut down. 56
The intensity and passion of the corporate
farming debate reflected the fears and pain of
thousands of farm families who left the land
after World War II. In a period when rural
depopulation quickened and many small towns
withered, the coming of corporate farming
seemed a likely culprit. For all the sound and
fury, however, the postwar economic transformation of American farming did not produce a production oligopoly of a few corporate
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giants. Farms grew and consolidated, but
largely within the confines of family operations. Corporate involvement in agricultural
production, whatever the extent, remains an
issue as rural America attempts to adapt to a
social structure with fewer farmers and fewer
farms.
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